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The Election Cycle and the U.S. Withdrawal
From Vietnam (1968-1973)
Few events in American history have proved to be as divisive and controversial as
U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War. Although U.S. policy in Indochina has its roots in
the Truman Administration , the two presidents most closely associated with the conflict
are Lyndon B. Johnson, and Richard M . Nixon. These two are particularly important
because they both occupied the White House during the highest levels of direct U.S.
involvement in the war. In terms of troop deployments to Southeast Asia, the level and
intensity of U .S. involvement peaked under the Johnson Administration and it was at this
time that the war began to be the focus of one of the large st and most controversial
social-political movements that this country has ever seen.
In the 1960's the anti-war movement both competed and commingled with the
Civil Rights movement and, like the Civil Rights movement before it, the anti-war
movement started from very small and humble beginnings : 1 In its infancy in the early
sixties the movement was mostly concentrated on or around college campuses; however ,
toward s the latter part of Johnson's first term in late 1967 and into 1968, the anti-war
movement-or

more importantly the anti-war message - had gained so much momentum

that the majority of Americans began to believe that U.S. entry into the war had been a
2

mistake . Recognizing this trend, many of the candidates for the presidency in 1968
began campaigning with the promise that they would end the war if they were elected.
This list included not only Democratic candidates like Eugene McCarthy, Robert
Kennedy, and later Hubert Humphrey; but also Republican candidate Richard M. Nixon,
1

Adam Fairclough , "Martin Luther King, Jr . and the War in Vietnam," Phy/on 45 (1984): 19.
William L. Lunch & Peter W. Sperlich, "American Public Opinion and the War in Vietnam," The Western
Political Quarterly 32 ( I 979): 25.
2

the eventual winner who campaigned with the now famous promise that he had a "secret
plan" to end the war. 3
Curiously, though, the war was not brought to a prompt close. Although Nixon
was elected in November of 1968, the peace agreement that finally ended U.S.
involvement in the conflict was not signed until more than four years later on January 27,
4

1973. In fact, while Nixon did scale down the number of U.S. troops involved in the
conflict, some of the other policies he pursued actually seemed to be escalating the war:
In his first term in office he expanded the mandate of "Operation Phoenix" to authorize
direct assassination of suspected communist political leaders by U.S. troops resulting in
the deaths of over 50,000 Vietnamese,5 he greatly widened the scope of the bombing
campaign to include Cambodia and North Vietnam, and he also authorized an invasion of
Laos and the mining of Haiphong Harbor. 6 If a general consensus around the need to end
the war in Vietnam was starting to form in 1968, then why did it take so long to actually
bring the conflict to a successful conclusion? That is the central research question of this
study.
I recognize that there were many factors that contributed to something as complex
as the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam, and rather than address them all individually and
superficially, I have decided to do an in-depth qualitative study of the one that I consider
to be the most important in determining the substance and, most importantly, the timing
3

William H . Chafe , The Unfinished Journey : America Since World War II l" ed. (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1999) 376.
4
David L. Anderson, ed ., Shadow on the White House: Presidents and the Vietnam War, 1945-1975,
(Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 1993) . 176.
5
The Assassination program of the Phoenix Operation (actually a joint program with the South Vietnamese
government) was one of the most controversial actions of the entire war, and there is still some dispute as
to the actual number of deaths that can be attributed to it.
5
Chafe , 389 -399 .
6
Chafe, 389-399.

2

of the U.S. withdrawal-the

U.S. election cycle. In many ways, this is a difficult task to

accomplish not only because of the exceptional nature of the Vietnam case, but also
because most of the existing scholarly literature I have been able to find dealing with
election cycles focus more on domestic factors like the business cycle on presidential
elections . Even then, the small minority of the literature that I did find on election cycles
and armed conflict or foreign policy focus almost exclusively on the influence election
cycles have on states getting into wars rather than getting out of them. I find this
omission to be rather remarkable considering the fact that if election cycles play a
significant role in the timing of states getting involved in armed conflict, then it makes
logical sense that they can also play a role on the opposite end in getting out of those
conflicts as well.
In this paper I begin by reviewing some of the relevant scholarly literature on
election cycles and foreign policy and/or war . After establishing some of the basic
characteristics that are normally associated with the impact of the electoral cycle on
foreign policy, I then briefly try to qualify some of the limitations in using that approach
on the particular case of Vietnam because of its exceptional nature in some respects .
Nevertheless , the electoral cycle approach remains a very useful tool in examining and
understanding the conduct, and most importantly the timing of the U.S. withdrawal from
Vietnam, and in the second section I apply the developments of that withdrawal (19681973) within the election cycle framework. Of particular importance in this section are
the presidential election of 1968, and the coalescence of public opinion around the need
to end the war after the Tet offensive in January of that year. Other absolutely crucial
elements that are examined are the actions taken by the Johnson and Nixon

3

Administrations to end the war. In the conclusion, I summarize the findings arrived at in
the previous section, and suggest that more studies on election cycles and war are needed,
particularly concerning the resolution of conflict.

THE IMPACT OF ELECTION CYCLES ON
WAR AND FOREIGN POLICY
Although they were not explicitly writing about the foreign policy consequences
of cycling, Resnick and Thomas wrote a general article on cyclical theories of politics
that explains some basic characteristics that are worth mentioning. One of the most
useful characteristics of using cyclical theories is that they greatly simplify predicting
outcomes by assuming that all other variables are constant and that time is the only
significant independent variable. Time can be used to measure a self-generating and
observable repeating sequence in either fixed or relative terms, but the predictive power
of any cyclical theory rests on its ability to accurately and consistently predict the
approximate time necessary to complete a full cycle. 7 The authors also split cycling
theory into 3 broad and non-mutually exclusive categories of value, electoral, and
governing cycles with electoral cycles generally operating on much shorter intervals than
the longer term value and governing cycles. In their conclusions the authors
acknowledge that, just as economists are unable to fully explain the business cycle,
proving how or why events cycle is extremely difficult. However, that does not change
the fact that understanding that the cycles exist is still very useful for prediction.

7

8

The example they use to illustrate this point is to say that America has been experiencing cycles of war
and peace for its entire history, but unless a theory can state something more specific such as America goes
to war every N years, it is not very useful for predictive purposes .
8
David Resnick, and Norman C. Thomas, "Cycling Through American Politics," Polity 23 ( 1990): 1-21.

4

Since a focus on the electoral cycle is the particular approach I take in this paper,
it is now time to examine the relevant literature on election cycles and international
relations . In a study examining electoral cycles and war among democratic states, Kurt
Taylor Gaubatz examined 69 different cases involving 17 democratic states in 45 wars
from 1815-1980 . He found that there is strong statistical evidence suggesting that the
initiation of a war right before an election is an extreme rarity, particularly with serious
wars involving over 1,000 battle deaths. There are only 3 cases in that time period where
a democracy entered a serious war in the year before an election-a

statistical

significance of over 99%. Conversely, there is also a disproportionate concentration of
war initiations at the beginning of an electoral cycle. Out of 42 cases there are only 5
instances where an election occurred more than 2 years prior to the entry into a war. The
author's aggregate data for serious wars entered into at the beginning of an electoral cycle
are also statistically significant above the 99% level. 9
While this data undeniably proves a strong statistical correlation between electoral
cycles and the timing of war initiation , Gaubatz is very quick to point out the causal
ambiguities inherent in the data . Do elections cause candidates to rattle the saber on the
campaign trail so much that they find themselves locked into a course of action that will
lead to conflict with neighboring states shortly thereafter, or do elections cause
candidates to pursue appeasement to the point that it encourages aggressive actions by
strong neighbors wishing to impose their will? These are just some of the possible causal
explanations that can be formulated to explain the relationship, and it is another good
example of the great level of difficulty in proving how cyclical theories actually function .
Another more disturbing possibility brought up by the author, though, is that "although
9

Kurt Taylor Gaubatz, "Election Cycles and War," The Journal of Conflict Resolution 35 ( 1991): 212-244.
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elections may discourage democracies from entering wars in the short run, they may
encourage ·other kinds of behaviors that make war either more likely or more severe in
the long run," such as encouraging a "hesitancy to take decisive action when international
pressures may require it." 10
Writing about presidential reelections and the use of force, Stoll utilizes the
rational self-interest perspective and argues that presidential incumbents' desire to win
reelection will lead them to use force abroad in visible ways that will help them achieve
that goal. He hypothesizes that in the year of a reelection and the first year of a
president's second term , the number of visible uses of force by the U.S. will be low if
they are not in (or close to) a war, and that they will be higher if the U.S. is involved in
(or close to) a war. He tests this by running a statistical analysis comparing both results
to the average use of force with no election and no war during the period 1947-1982.
After controlling for a number of potentially confounding variables, he concludes that
there is mild evidence to support his original thesis. 11
Stoll 's findings are not exceedingly remarkable and, like Gaubatz, he admits that
he cannot establish any causal direction. Also, in dealing with visible uses of force , Stoll
seems to focus more on the "rally-around-the-flag" phenomenon associated with the
initial use of force , and its susceptibility to political manipulation rather than any other
aspect of the use of force that might be applicable to the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam.

12

That war was started long before the withdrawal began which diminishes the possibility
of an initial use of force rally-around-the-flag phenomenon from effecting the elections of

10

Gaubatz, 237-238.
Richard J. Stoll, "The Guns of November: Presidential Reelections and the Use of Force, 1947-1982,"
The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 28 (1984): 231-246 .
12
Ibid, 233.
11

6

1968 or 1972. However, this does not mean that his findings are completely useless
because if we accept the rational self-interest perspective of presidents seeking reelection
and their willingness to use force abroad in order to achieve this goal, then it is certainly
plausible that the same phenomenon could work in reverse, and that presidents would
decrease the use of force in order to end a conflict abroad right before an election should
it prove to be politically expedient. This same logic can be used to turn around, and
possibly even complement Gaubatz's findings on the paucity of war initiation right
before elections.
Thus far, the scho larly literature I have discussed has only dealt with generalities
of cycles and their broad tendencies concerning the timing of democratic states' entrance
into armed conflict. I would love to include more detailed accounts of the effect of the
election cycle on the cessation of hostilities , but I have been unable to find anything that
explicitly deals with that particular aspect. For this reason , I have tried to take the
existing literature and demonstrate that reversing the focus of those studies does not
necessarily contradict their conclusions and, in fact, seems to retain a high degree of
plausibility. The last article I will discuss is both the most general and, probably for that
reason, the most useful article I have been able to find that deals with the effect of the
presidential election cycle on foreign policy as far as the withdrawal from Vietnam is
concerned, and it is this article that serves as the primary model for my analysis.
William B. Quandt has argued that there are several fundamental problems
associated with presidential conduct of foreign policy that are constitutionally rooted in
the 4-year cycle of presidential elections, particularly in the first term. He argues that the
same divisions of power and system of checks and balances that are so desirable and

7

widely applauded for their beneficial qualities on the domestic level have had decidedly
negative effects when it comes to foreign policy; "The price we pay is a foreign policy
excessively geared to short-term calculations, in which narrow domestic political
considerations often outweigh sound strategic thinking, and where turnover in high
positions is so frequent that consistency and coherence are lost." 13
Specifically, Quandt identifies several general problems that are associated with
each year of a new president's first term, and the general lame-duck problems that they
face during a second term. In the first year of a new president's first term he is usually
largely inexperienced in foreign affairs, and generally commits several mistakes and/or
pursues unrealistic policies due to overconfidence or wishful thinking in his ability to
change the international order. The first year is a time of learning characterized by trialand-error as he familiarizes himself with a largely new component of power and begins
working out a new management style to deal with it. The first year usually ends with a
reassessment of the now stalled policies he began pursuing at the beginning. The second
year is usually characterized by greater success brought on by pursuing more realistic and
less ambitious goals, and a greater reliance on the experts within the foreign policy
bureaucracy . By this point, a greater level of trust has usually been gained, and most of
the dissenters have either been purged or resigned.
Risky ventures are usually left until the third year to avoid any electoral
repercussions in the mid-term elections if such a policy fails. Reelection concerns start
manifesting themselves at this point, and there is usually a push for a big foreign policy
success: "The administration will even be prepared on occasions to pay heavily with

13

William B. Quandt, "The Electoral Cycle and the Conduct of Foreign Policy," Political Science
Quarterly IOI ( 1986): 826.

8

concessions or with promises of aid and arms to get an agreement," and "the price of
agreement may become very high as the parties to negotiations realize how badly
Washington wants a success."

14

However, if the probability for success is low, bold

initiatives will be quickly abandoned before they can start having a negative effect on the
reelection chances during the final year of the first term.
In the fourth year of a president's first term he is usually too busy campaigning to
seriously commit himself to major foreign policy initiatives. He generally tends to keep
foreign policy rhetoric patriotic but vague, and avoids beginning any new initiatives.
Major foreign policy successes are rare in the 4 th year because of the time requirements of
campaigning, and also because other states are reluctant to negotiate with someone unless
they are sure that that individual will still be in the White House after November. The
first year and a half of a president's second term is usually when he has the most power.
Receiving a fresh electoral mandate and benefiting from the experience gained in his first
term , a president is usually given free rein to accomplish his agenda. However,
depending on the outcome of the mid-term elections, he is increasingly confronted with
lame duck problems, and congressional opposition toward the final two years of their
presidency.

15

In sum: "a learning process seems invariably to take place in the course of a fouryear term. By the end, most presidents recognize that some of what they tried early in
their term was unrealistic; they have become more familiar with the limits on their power;
they aim lower and pay more attention to the timing of their major moves."

16

Although

some of Quandt's generalizations do not apply to the case of the U.S. withdrawal from
14

Quandt, 832.
The preceeding paragraphs comprise a general summary ofQuandt's findings, 829-833 .
16
Ibid, 829.
15

9

Vietnam, most of them fit the case so well that it establishes a useful body of evidence in
support of the conclusion that the electoral cycle played a major role in both the content
and timing of the Johnson and Nixon Administrations' attempts to end the war.

The Exceptional Nature of the Vietnam Case
Before I get into the application of the Vietnam case, it is important to note a few
things that make it an exception to some of the rules and generalities discussed above .
First of all, for a variety of reasons the Vietnam War was more complex, and on a scale
greater than any U.S. intervention since World War II. It saw the intersection of a civil
war with the geopolitical interests of all three major Cold War powers, and because of
this , the number of players involved in the war and its settlement were unusually large-a
major factor that contributed to the great complexity of the situation. There were four
main participants in the Pari s peace talks: the United States , the Government of South
Vietnam in Saigon (GVN), the government of North Vietnam in Hanoi (NVN), and the
Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam (PRG) - the political wing of
the Vietcong and National Liberation Front (NLF) . In addition to those four main players,
the Soviet Union, People s' Republic of China , and France - who hosted the peace talksall played some smaller, but important roles as well.
Aside from the complexity of the situation, another exception is that Richard
Nixon was not the typical first-term president inexperienced in foreign policy that
Quandt's electoral cycle model generally assumes to be the case . He had gained
significant foreign policy experience while serving as Eisenhower's Vice-President for
eight years, and he entered the office with a clear idea of what direction he wanted to take

10

the country in terms of detente with China and the Soviet Union . 17 Another dissimilarity
was that Johnson dropped out of the race for reelection on March 31, 1968.

18

This means

that any rational self-interest approach to analyzing Johnson's actions in the last part of
his final term cannot really be applied. At least not unless it can be proven, as some
people suspected at the time, that had he been successful in making a major breakthrough
before the election he would have reentered the race during the convention as the peace
candidate . 19 While that is definitely a possibility, it is unfortunately an event that can
never be proven and will have to be abandoned in order to prevent tainting the analysis
with hypothetical motivational theories .
However, while Johnson was not running for reelection in 1968, in many respects
Hubert Humphrey was. As Johnson 's Vice-President, Humphrey was inexorably tied to
Johnson's war policy in the public mind .20 Humphrey repeatedly had wanted to distance
himself from the administration , but Johnson had always responded by putting pressure
on him to stay in line .2 1 Late in the election , though , Humphrey finally broke with the
Admini stration in a famous speech in Salt Lake City on Sept. 29, and while this did lead
to a late surge for the Vice-President , he was still unable to defeat Nixon.

17

22

Melvin Small, "The Election of 1968," Diplomatic History 28 (2004) : 515 . In 1967, Nixon wrote an
article in Foreign Affairs where he argued that the U.S. should try to improve its relations with China; a
notable shift from his earlier anti-communist stance, and a clear indication of what he wanted to accomplish
with detente.
18
Hunter S. Thompson, Fear and Loathing on the Campaign Trail '72, (New York: Warner Books, 1982).
140.
19
Small, 520 .
2
Converse, et al., I 090 .
21
Page & Brody , 990; Small, 522.
22
Small, 525 .

°
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THE U.S. WITHDRAWAL FROM VIETNAM (1968-1973)
The Vietnam War was often cited as the most important issue facing the country
throughout this time period, and it played a very important role in the election of 1968.23
That year was particularly significant because it was also the year that saw the turnaround
and crystallization of American public opinion against the war. 24 Noting this changeas well as the change in his own popularity that was brought on by it-President

Johnson

decided to drastically alter his previous policy and attempt to end the war through
negotiations from May to November of 1968. After those efforts failed, President Nixon
still recognized the necessity to end the war swiftly while simultaneously obtaining
"peace with honor."

25

In order to accomplish this, Nixon initially utilized the "Madman Theory," a
strategy designed to intimidate the North Vietnamese into settling the conflict on U.S.
terms.

26

In order to buy time domestically throughout this process Nixon also began the

gradual phasing out of U.S. combat troops, while simultaneously training and equipping
South Vietnamese forces of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARYN aka RVNAF)
to take their place. This de-Americanization process was originally suggested as an
option by Clark Clifford when he replaced Robert McNamara as Johnson's Secretary of
Defense, but when implemented under Nixon it came to be known as "Vietnamization."

27

As the war dragged on, however, it became apparent that the North Vietnamese were not
being coerced into cooperating. Furthermore, the success of Vietnamization was brought

23

Ibid, 528 .
Lunch & Sperlich, 30.
25
Chafe, 388.
26
Jeffrey Kimball, The Vietnam War Files: Uncovering the Secret History of Nixon-Era Strategy,
(Lawrence Kansas : Universtiy of Kansas Press, 2004) 55.
27
Ibid, 77; Larry Berman , Lyndon Johnson's War(New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1991).
24
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into question as the AR VN consistently underperformed both offensively and defensively
in direct engagements with the North Vietnamese Army (NV A aka PA VN).
As the Madman Theory failed to achieve the desired results, a shift in goals began
occurring within the Nixon Administration. In late 1970 and early 1971 a growing
consensus began to emerge that the most feasible solution to end the conflict would be to
achieve a "decent interval" between the U.S. withdrawal and a possible victory of the
North Vietnamese over the South. 28 Significant progress toward the attainment of this
goal was achieved toward the latter part of 1971 and more explicitly in 1972 when the
U.S .- through secret diplomacy in Paris involving NSC Advisor Henry Kissinger and
representatives from the Hanoi Government - began making serious concessions from
their previous bargaining positions. Although this negotiation process encountered
several hang-ups along the way , it almost succeeded in ending the conflict before the
election in November 1972, and eventually resulted in the conclusion of the negotiations
on January 13, 1973 .29
Public Opinion and the Election of 1968

The year 1968 was perhaps the most turbulent single year in American History
since the end of post -Civil War reconstruction , and the presidential election was greatly
influenced by that environment. Although a majority of Americans began to believe that
the war was a mistake in late 1967, at that point their preferred policy outcome to end the
war was actually one of escalation. 30 That soon changed when the North Vietnamese

28

Jeffrey Kimball , Nixon 's Vietnam War, (Lawrence Kansas: University Press of Kansas , 1998) 240 .
Tad Szulc , " How Kissinger Did It: Behind the Vietnam Cease-Fire Agreement," Foreign Policy 15
(1974) : 63 .
30
Lunch & Sperlich, 25 .
29
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launched the massive Tet Offensive on January 31, 1968.3 1 This event, which received
broad news coverage in America, is widely considered to be the major turning point for
public opinion against further escalation of the war, and the fallout from Tet was
tremendously damaging to the Johnson Administration.

32

After Eugene McCarthy, the

anti-war challenger to Johnson for the Democratic presidential nomination, captured 42%
of the primary vote in New Hampshire and Robert Kennedy-another
candidate-entered

anti-war

the race in March, it became clear that Johnson would not be able to

recapture the Democratic Party nomination for the presidency. In a pivotal speech to the
nation on March 31, he announced that he was going to issue a bombing halt and deny
General Westmoreland's request for 206,000 additional troops and an activation of the
reserves. He also signaled his willingness to negotiate with the North Vietnamese, and
announced that he would not seek reelection for a second term .33 Public opinion was not
the only driving factor in his decision to deny Westmoreland's request, though, because
at that point in the midst of a deepening economic crisis in March, a further escalation of
that magnitude had become an economic as well as a political impossibility.

34

The war was such an important issue in the 1968 election that when asked on
election day what the most pressing problem Washington faced was, "nearly half the
people spontaneously mentioned Vietnam-far

31

more than mentioned any other issue or

Berman, 145.
Chafe, 347; Lunch & Sperlich, 26.
33
Small , 520. It is important to note that not all those who voted for McCarthy wanted to de-escalate the
war. A vote for McCarthy was generally viewed as an anti-Johnson vote, and in fact "as many as 40% of
McCarthy voters favored escalation rather than withdrawal." (Small, 519). Other estimates put that ratio
as high as 3:2 in favor of escalation (Converse et. al, I 092). The important thing is that disaffection with
the Johnson Administration on the war was so great that he would have had severe difficulties had he
stayed in the race.
34
Robert M. Co llins, "The Economic Crisis of 1968 and the Waning of the ' American Century,"' American
Historical Review 101 (I 996): 417 .
32
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cluster of issues." 35 As remarkable as this statistic is, it does not accurately represent the
pervasiveness of the war as an issue in the election. The reason for this is because the
war was also tied to almost every other important issue in some way or another. The two
most important election issues other than the war were Civil Rights and "law and order,"
and it is easy to see how they were both influenced by the Vietnam War: 36 Martin Luther
King Jr., in a very controversial move, began speaking out against the war in February,
1967, and anti-war protests were a main source of the civil disobedience and radicalism
that brought the many confrontations with the police which created the appearance of a
breakdown in law and order. 37 Perhaps the most famous examp le of this breakdown in
law and order occurred during the Democratic National Convention in August. In the
aftermath of those brutal and televised police-beatings of anti-war protestors, only 3% of
the population was sympathetic to the protestors - a surprisingly low number considering
the majority of the population also felt that the war was a mistake .38 Additionally,
although the economic crisis of 1968 is usually overlooked because of everything else
going on in that watershed year, the chronic balance-of-payment deficits were greatly
exacerbated by expenditures on the war. This effectively "sparked off a round of
inflation that twisted the economy out of shape, with consequences that would still be felt
decades later. " 39

35

Benjamin I. Page, and Richard A . Brody, "Policy Voting and the Electora l Process : The Vietnam War
Issue," The American Political Science Review 66 ( 1972): 982.
36
Philip E. Converse, et al. , "Continuity and Change in American Politics : Parties and Issues in the 1968
Election," The Am erican Political Science Review 63 ( 1969): I 088.
37
Fairclough, 29.
38
Co nver se et al. , I 088
39
Collins , 196-197. Other contributing factors to the economic crisis that the author cites are the gold
exchange standard, international monetary speculation and crises , and the Johnson Administration's
comp lete refusal to raise taxes to prevent economic overheating until it was too late ( 410) .
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Although the war had a profound effect on almost every aspect of the election,
ironically the major party candidates' positions on the war had almost no effect on how
people voted.

40

The major reason for this was because in the public perception there was

very little difference between Humphrey's and Nixon's stances on the war. 41 This
inability to distinguish differences was not a simple case of uninformed voters because
the electorate could successfully discern that third party candidate George Wallace and
his running-mate Curtis LeMay-derogatorily
some-took

nicknamed the "Bombsey Twins" by

a much stronger stance on Vietnam, and that Eugene McCarthy was

generally viewed as a more dovish candidate. 42 Furthermore, the people who thought
there was a big difference between Humphrey and Nixon concerning the war merely
"projected their own opinions onto their favored candidate." 43 These perceptions and
misperceptions were both fed by the candidates' ambiguous language and lack of specific
policies, but the important thing to note is that both candidates were promising that they
would end the war. That both major party candidates would take nearly indistinguishable
stances on the war issue is an excellent indicator of the public mood at the time , and
clearly demonstrates the consensus around the need to end the war that existed in 1968.
The desire to end the war should not be confused with a desire for a complete
withdrawal, however, because that was certainly not the case. Support for a withdrawal
from Vietnam in the public opinion polls did not top 50% until very late 1970 and early

40

Page & Brody, 982.
Ibid , 983.
42
Small, 525 ; Page & Brody, 992.
43
Page & Brody, 986.
41
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1971, which meant that the newly elected president had some time in the beginning to try
and end the war through other means. 44

1968: Johnson's Early Efforts to End the War and the Nixon Response
By announcing his willingness to begin peace talks in the unprecedented speech
on March 31, Johnson reversed his longstanding policy of refusing to negotiate with the
North Vietnamese, and for the first time since the war began it appeared like real progress
could be made on the diplomatic front. In April, the North Vietnamese agreed to meet in
45

Paris, and the talks formally began in May .

The North Vietnamese chose Paris as the

location for the talks largely because it was viewed as a neutral location, and for the next
five years the French would do their best to preserve that neutral image while the
sporadic negotiations were taking place.

46

The talks initially got off to a slow start , mostly because Johnson was not willing
to give up much in the negotiations . Part of the problem stemmed from severe
disagreements and infighting among his top advisors. Hard liners like Dean Rusk fought
bitterly to push for maximum military pressure while Doves like Clark Clifford favored a
"mutual de-escalation and disengagement through negotiations , even at the expense of
South Vietnam."

47

After some delays, Johnson finally settled on pursuing a tough

negotiating stance while simultaneously putting on military pressure, a stance that clearly
48

leaned toward the Rusk faction .

He instructed his chief negotiator, Averell Harriman,

44

Lunch & Sperlich , 26.
George C. Herring , LBJ and Vietnam: A Different Kind of War, (Austin: University of Texas Press , 1994)
164; Small, 520 .
46
Marianna P. Sullivan, "France and the Vietnam Peace Settlement ," Political Science Quarterly, 89
(1974) : 310.
47
Herring, 165.
48
Herring, 167.
45
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that he was to obtain a "communist promise to stop attacks on cities in South Vietnam, to
respect the demilitarized zone , and to accept South Vietnam's participation in the peace
talks ," and that there would only be a bombing halt if it would not disadvantage the
military.

49

The president's "hard-line, no-concessions approach to the Paris

talks . ..offered no incentive to the North Vietnamese to enter into substantive discussions,
and the talks dragged into the summer with no discemable progress ." 50
Although Johnson had received word through the Soviet Union in early June that
North Vietnam was "ready to negotiate if the United states would stop the bombing ," and
received essentially the same message directly from the North Vietnamese in private talks
again in mid-September , Johnson remained reluctant to commit to any bombing halt
unless he was absolutely certain that he would get a reciprocal concession from the
North. 51 Progress towards a guarantee of that concession came in late September and
early October , thanks in no small part to the efforts of the Soviet Union. Recognizing
Humphrey's campaign was in trouble and fearing that the anti-communist Nixon would
win the election , the Soviets began pressuring North Vietnam to "soften their terms for
opening serious peace talks." 52 Their efforts paid off, and on October 11 a major
breakthrough in the talks occurred when the North Vietnamese agreed to accept the
participation of the Government of South Vietnam in the peace talks in exchange for a
bombing halt that was to take place on October 31 st •53 Johnson and his advisors,
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particularly the doves, were pleased with the turn of events and believed that a significant
step toward peace had been achieved with the agreement to begin serious negotiations .
The Nixon camp did not just sit idly by and wait for Johnson to end the war,
though. As the negotiations with the North Vietnamese progressed in October, the Nixon
campaign became increasingly worried that Johnson was trying to get Humphrey
reelected by ending the war. 54 In early October, through his contacts in the Johnson
Administration, Henry Kissinger found out about the bombing halt and that negotiations
would begin at the end of the month . Recognizing the importance of the situation, and
hedging his bets for a possible Republican victory in November, Kissinger leaked that
information to the Nixon campaign. 55 In an attempt to counteract this positive
development in the peace talks by Johnson, the Nixon campaign stealthily used Anna
Chennault's contacts within the South Vietnamese government to deliver the Republican
position that Saigon should "hold fast and not participate in the peace talks," because
Nixon would offer them a better deal after he was elected. 56 Although Nixon argued that
he could not reveal how he would end the war in Vietnam on the grounds that, "an
explanation might interfere with the efforts of the Johnson Administration to achieve a
settlement ," and that "words from an irresponsible candidate might 'torpedo' the
deliberations," it is obvious that the actions the Nixon campaign took in October were
intended to do just that. 57
The overall effect that those efforts had on disrupting the successful resolution of
the conflict before the election , though, is actually rather negligible since it is widely

54

Kimball , (1998): 59.
Ibid , 58.
56
Small , 527 .
57
Page & Brody , 988 .
55

19

accepted that Thieu would have rejected the deal even without any encouragement on
their part. 58 The important thing to note about this development is that it clearly
illustrates the willingness of both Nixon and Kissinger to politicize the war for domestic
electoral purposes. The Chennault affair sets a clear precedent and implies that if they
were willing to politicize the war in 1968, then there is no reason to believe that they
would not also be as willing to do so in 1972.
Thieu delayed his public rejection of the deal the U.S. had made with the North
until the day before the bombing halt was to go into effect-six

days before the U.S.

election .59 When the U.S . went ahead with the bombing halt anyway, Thieu failed to
send a representative to Paris for several weeks , stalled the talks with procedural
objections, and "made demands neither North Vietnam nor the United States could
accept." 60 Thieu ' s efforts to disrupt the peace talks completely destroyed Johnson's
efforts to bring the conflict to a close; "By the time the procedural issues had been
resolved , the Johnson administration was in its last days and any hopes for substantive
negotiations had passed." 6 1 Nixon ' s electoral victory over Humphrey in November
meant that the mantle of leadership concerning Vietnam would pass on to him, and he
was prepared to tackle the problem. Having seen what the war had done to Lyndon
Johnson , Nixon entered the White House determined that things would be very different
for him.
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Nixon, the Madman Theory, and Vietnamization,
It is clear that Nixon took office intent on ending the war: "I'm not going to end
up like LBJ, holed up in the White House afraid to show my face on the street. I'm going
to stop that war. Fast." 62 The exact timetable Nixon had under consideration is difficult
to discern, but there is strong evidence to conclude that he greatly overestimated his
chances of being able to end the war quickly: He told Michigan Congressman Donald
Reigle that "he thought he could end the war six months after taking office," and H.R.
Haldeman, one of Nixon's top aides, has also said that, "[Nixon] was absolutely
convinced he would end it in his first year." 63
Part of the reason for Nixon's overconfidence is because he strongly believed that
he could capitalize on his reputation as an ardent anti-communist and pursue a strategy
very similar to the one Eisenhower did in ending the Korean War where he threatened to
use nuclear weapons if the Chinese did not agree to an immediate cease-fire.

64

Nixon

called this strategy the "Madman Theory" and its central component was that he appeared
to be irrational and obsessed with ending the war at any cost. According to Haldemann,
Nixon told him that:
I want the North Vietnamese to believe I've reached the point where I might do
anything to stop the war. We'll just slip the word to them that, 'for god's sake,
you know Nixon is obsessed about Communism. We can't restrain him when he's
angry-and he has his hand on the nuclear button'-and Ho Chi Minh himself
will be in Paris in two days begging for peace. 65

Kissinger would play an integral role in this process because, as one author has put it, the
Madman Theory was essentially a game of good cop/bad cop between the two of them
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and the North Vietnamese. 66 In addition to pressuring the North Vietnamese, though,
Nixon and Kissinger also believed that they could link detente with both China and the
Soviet Union to their efforts to pressure Hanoi to accept the negotiated settlement to the
war that the U.S. was offering. 67 They were confident that a combination of these two
strategies was guaranteed to succeed.
Nixon recognized that this strategy could be undermined by domestic opposition
to the war at home. He knew that some of the actions he needed to take in Vietnam in
order to fit the madman profile (i.e. the bombing and invasions of Cambodia and Laos,
the bombings of Hanoi and Haiphong, and the mining of the harbor) could bring severe
criticism which would damage the credibility of his attempts to negotiate from a position
of strength. In order to counter this, the Nixon Administration began their efforts to
silence war critics immediately upon taking office. Nixon hoped to be able to silence the
majority of mainstream criticism by immediately scaling back the number of troops
deployed to the region, and shifting the military burden more onto the ARYN. This
Vietnamization process would also enable him to eventually phase out the draft. 68
Withdrawal of US troops and phasing out the draft was largely successful against
mainstream war critics, but he also utilized a range of more questionable behavior and
techniques against the more established anti-war movement and media that would later
get them into trouble during the Watergate scandal. This included: illegal wiretapping ,
misuse of the CIA and FBI as well as using private groups created from within the
executive to perform other acts of domestic surveillance and espionage, intimidating the
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media with FCC monitoring, antitrust actions, IRS investigations, and favoring proadministration editors and journalists.

69

While their efforts were largely successful in dampening the public reaction to
perceived escalations, they did not eliminate them entirely. The Kent State massacre on
May 4, 1970 is one of the most well-known tragedies of the era, and that student protest
was a direct response to the public disclosure that US forces had invaded Cambodia. 70
This incident sparked even larger protests, and as US actions failed to force the North
Vietnamese to come to the negotiating table and the war continued to drag on, the Nixon
Administration found itself in an increasingly difficult spot. By January of 1971, the
policy option preferred by the majority of Americans was one of withdrawal.

71

It is no

wonder, then, that with its original plan to end the war failing to meet their expectations
and the next election a little less than 2 years away, the Nixon White House opted for a
change in goals and strategy.
Although it was not adopted as a private policy goal until late December, 1970
and early 1971, the strategy that was later referred to as the "decent interval" or "healthy
interval" solution to the war actually originated as one of the three options in a RAND
corporation report that Kissinger had commissioned immediately after Nixon was elected
in 1968. It comprised the views of a significant minority group of dissenters within
various government agencies who believed that the U.S. position was untenable and that
they should try to achieve a compromise negotiated settlement to end the war. Two of
the most notable recommendations to achieve this were the creation of a tripartite
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electoral commission in South Vietnam, and a separation of the political from the military
settlement. This would allow the U.S. to achieve an honorable exit without being
entangled in the internal political struggle to determine the fate of Vietnam. 72 The
"decent interval" part of the name "referred to a scenario in which the period between
America ' s withdrawal from Indochina and the Saigon government's possible defeat
would be long enough that when the fall came-if

it came-it

would not appear that

Nixon's policies had been responsible for South Vietnam's collapse." 73 In order to
pursue this new objective , Kissinger set out in a different direction and began making
serious political concessions in 1971 and 1972.

Kissinger and Serious Negotiations: May 31, 1971-January

27, 1973

President Nixon had set the initial U.S. bargaining position for both the public and
secret negotiations in a speech on Oct. 7, 1970. The main provisions were for an
Indochina wide cease-fire , complete withdrawals of U.S. and North Vietnamese forces
from the South, release of American POWs, and an Indochina wide peace conference.
For its part , Hanoi was basically demanding an unconditional withdrawal of U.S. forces
and the removal of the Thieu regime in the South. 74 As a result of such drastically
divergent negotiating positions , "no visible progress was achieved in either forum for
nearly two years ." 75 In describing the inability of the two sides to successfully negotiate
during that time, one analyst observed that the negotiations were never really that serious .
The uncompromising pursuit of mutually unacceptable positions was unrealistic because
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"both sides were demanding the fruits of military victory without having achieved that
victory." 76
However , after suffering some serious domestic political setbacks in early 1971
such as continued war protests, the conviction in a military court of First Lieutenant
William Calley Jr. for his part in the My Lai massacre, the initial publication of the
Pentagon Papers by the New York Times, as well as the poor performance of the ARYN
in their first major offensive against the NV A from February 8 to March 24, Nixon ' s
public approval rating began to decline . In response , Nixon and Kissinger put together a
7-point plan on May 31 st that hinted that the U.S. might be willing to drop its insistence
that the North Vietnamese remove their troops from the South. While that offer was not
explicit , Kissinger considered this to be "the first real negotiations since the process
began." 77 The North Vietnamese responded with a 9-point counterproposal that was
rejected by the U.S., and as a result, both sides shied away from any more serious efforts
to negotiate with the U.S. doing what it could to shore up support for Thieu in the
upcoming October election in South Vietnam , and the North Vietnamese preparing for
the massive offensive they had planned for the Spring of 1972.78
The real political breakthrough that got the negotiations back on track occurred
after North Vietnam launched that massive spring offensive on March 30, 1972. At a
secret summit meeting in Moscow from April 20-24, Kissinger conveyed to the Soviets
the position that the U.S. would drop its insistence on the removal of North Vietnamese
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troops from South Vietnam if they removed the estimated 30,000 to 40 ,000 that had
entered since the offensive began. This deal was conditional on the fact that North
Vietnam also dropped its insistence on the removal of the Thieu regime before any
agreement was signed. While the U.S. had hinted that it might be willing to allow North
Vietnamese forces to stay in the South in the May 31st proposal, and again in October of
1971, this was the first time that the offer was made explicit, and Kissinger gave the
Russians the task of delivering the message to the North Vietnamese.
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On May 3, Kissinger had his first secret meeting with the North Vietnamese in
almost 8 months, but they were in no mood to negotiate after the success of the Spring
Offensive. Recognizing the need to do something to roll back their advances and prevent
a total collapse of the ARYN as well as give the North an incentive to come back to
negotiate, Nixon authorized the bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong as well as the mining of
the harbor. Nixon went through with this rather risky plan on May 8, despite the warning
from his top advisors that there was a 50% chance that the Soviets would cancel the
upcoming May 24-30 summit meeting in response. The Soviets did not cancel the
summit , however , and in subsequent talks between Kissinger and the Soviets on May 25 th
and 26 1\ he softened the U.S. negotiating stance even more: He indicatied that the U.S.
might be willing to drop its insistence on no bombing halts until all POWs had been
returned, and that the U.S. could support the creation of a tripartite electoral commission.
These provisions were contrary to the public negotiating stance of the U.S., but also
formed "the foundations for what would become the ultimate settlement."
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In mid-June Kissinger went to China to solicit Chinese support in ending the
conflict, and he also expressed interest in meeting with Hanoi before the Democratic
National Convention. Although he was told by Chou En-lai that "China would not press
Hanoi one way or another," in July Chairman Mao told France's Foreign Minister that
"he advised Madame Binh, the Vietcong Foreign Minister, to desist from making
demands for Thieu's resignation as a precondition."
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Kissinger had another secret

meeting with the North on July 19th that was uneventful because both sides simply
"rehashed their positions ... but, importantly, the two sides agreed to keep in touch." 82
Further meetings on August 1st and 15th made more progress towards an
agreement on a tripartite electoral commission. Alexander Haig and Ellsworth Bunker,
the U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam, were both tasked with selling the idea to
President Thieu, but he rejected them outright. Frustrated by this lack of cooperation,
Kissinger asked for Nixon's approval to continue negotiating the terms of the tripartite
commission with the North on September 15th despite Thieu's rejection of the idea.
Arguing that the President could not afford a breakdown in the peace talks seven weeks
before the election Kissinger received the go-ahead from the President. On September 26,
1972 Kissinger formally presented the tripartite electoral commission idea in Paris and
remarked to his staff that "there was a good chance that the 'Vietnam Cancer' could be
removed before the November Elections," which was a personal relief to him because he
felt that "it endangered detente." 83
The breakthrough with the North came on October 8th when the North
Vietnamese presented their first comprehensive peace proposal of the entire war instead
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of a list of demands. The document not only dropped their previous position on Theiu's
removal , but also agreed to separate the political from the military settlement. Although
several details remained to be negotiated, the two sides reached an agreement "in
principle" on October 11th • Kissinger still had to get the approval of Presidents Nixon
and Thieu, but the North Vietnamese adamantly insisted that the agreement be signed on
October , 31. 8 Kissinger was quite confident that this could be accomplished by that date
but, while Nixon agreed that "the draft was basically acceptable" on October

Ii\

after

an unsuccessful four days of trying to convince Thieu, Kissinger informed Nixon on
rd

October 23 that the negotiations had hit a snag and that he would have to cancel his trip
to Hanoi. 84
In response to this, the North Vietnamese went public with the details of the
agreement , forcing Kissinger to do some damage control and assert that the negotiations
had not reached an impasse and declare that "peace is at hand" despite private
reservations to the contrary. Thieu's rejection of the peace agreement was a major
problem , but not an unfamiliar one. In a sense of tragic irony (or cosmic karma), the
situation was almost exactly the same as the Johnson negotiations in 1968 when, with the
support of Nixon, Theiu rejected the U.S . backed peace proposal right before the election.
In reality , though, both Nixon and the North Vietnamese began backing away at this
point. Nixon was getting criticism from hawks in the government that he was giving
away too much, and as the ARYN launched a new offensive against the overextended
NV A in early November the situation on the ground no longer appeared to favor Hanoi. 85
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In the face of increasing reticence on the part of Hanoi to go through with the
th

negotiations, on December 18 Nixon launched operation Linebacker II, also called the
"Christmas Bombing," aerial attacks on Hanoi and Haiphong that was "the largest and
most violent sustained bombing of the war." 86
The bombing stopped on December 29 1\ the North Vietnamese agreed to resume
the peace talks on January 7, and the negotiations were concluded on January 13, 1973.87
The final peace treaty , which "was essentially the same as that reached in October," was
signed by all four members of the Paris peace talks on January 27, 1973.88 More than
four years after promising to end U.S. involvement in the war, Nixon finally reached an
agreement to accomplish that goal. Even then, though , the future fate of Saigon remained
uncertain. However, that uncertainty turned into concrete reality on April 30, 1975 with
the dramatic and widely televised fall of Saigon. 89 The decent interval that Nixon and
Kissinger sought turned out to be about two years and three months.

CONCLUSIONS
In his article detailing the history of Kissinger's efforts to end the war Tad Szulc
made a very important observation:
It is remarkable -a nd instructive-to note the extremely close parallels between
the negotiations of 1972 and the U.S.-North Vietnamese negotiations of 1968
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concerning the cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam[ . .. ]the structure of the
two negotiations was virtually identical, right down to the exact date on which the
North Vietnamese demanded the agreement; each time, it was October 31 [ ... ]In
both cases it would appear that the critical factor as far as timing was concerned
was the impending Presidential election. 90
Despite the several reasons why the Vietnam case is of an exceptional nature, it
seems that the influence of the electoral cycle still had a profound effect on the content
and timing of the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam. Even though Nixon entered the White
House with significant foreign policy experience, he was still not immune from the
overconfidence and grandiose visions of success that plague other first-term presidents.
It is obvious that he greatly overestimated the effectiveness of the Madman Theory and as

a result, he also greatly underestimated the time necessary to end the war in accordance
with his goals of achieving "peace with honor." .
He also overestimated the willingness of the U.S.S.R and China to put serious
pressure on Hanoi to settle the conflict. Although they both urged the North Vietnamese
to accept a negotiated settlement, as well as facilitated communication and trust by
delivering Kissinger's messages and helping to convince Hanoi that the offers were
genuine, throughout the entire conflict neither power cut off their arn1s shipments.
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Hanoi was also working its own triangle diplomacy at that time , and neither the Soviet
Union nor China felt that they could suspend shipments because it would bring into
question their commitment to support their socialist ally. 92 As a result, Nixon's desire to
link detente with the PRC and U.S.S.R. to their assistance in ending the Vietnam War
backfired to the point that in several instances the inability of the U.S. to end the war
actually endangered detente.
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The inability to realize the ineffectiveness of his initial approach persisted through
the second year of his term until Nixon began drastically softening his negotiating
position in the third and fourth year, most notably after the Spring Offensive in 1972
when electoral pressures to end the war were mounting and the bargaining leverage
afforded by an ever diminishing number of U.S. forces began weakening the realities on
the ground. 93 In fact, in his rush to end the war before the election, he seemed to have
gone too far, resulting in backpedaling on the October agreement. In order to avoid the
perception that the U.S. was cutting and running, particularly after Thieu rejected the
offer , "Nixon believed that politically he could not afford to sign the October treaty."
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So far, these developments are largely consistent with Quandt's generalizations,
but the Vietnam case manifests its largest and most obvious departure from that model
during the fourth year of the first term .95 Quandt's model predicts that there would be no
major effort at a big new foreign policy initiative because the incumbent would be too
busy campaigning, and that "e lection years rarely witness great success in foreign
policy ." 96 This was clearly not the case with the withdrawal from Vietnam where almost
all of the major negotiating breakthroughs came in 1972, but again here there are several
mitigating circumstances at work. First of all, the war was not a new issue. It had been
around since before Nixon was in the White House , and by that time it was simply much
too big of an issue to be pushed off to the side and dealt with later; especially after he was
elected in 1968 with the promise that he would end the war. Second, almost all of the
93
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negotiating was done by Henry Kissinger which freed Nixon to actively campaign back
home.
Furthermore Quandt himself recognizes that Nixon was the great exception to this
rule. He was a master politician who under stood very well that his skillful foreign policy
success would help his reelection more than anything else; "In 1972 he brought the
American involvement in Vietnam to an end, he traveled to China, and he signed the
SALT I agreement in Moscow. All this took place in the space of several months and in
an election year." 97 Although he fudged the date a little bit on the end of the Vietnam
War , there is no mistaking the fourth quarter foreign policy blitz that Nixon pursued in
1972, and I don't think it is mere coincidence that Kissinger's two years of secret
th

negotiations with the North Vietnamese was not made public until January 25 of that
year. 98
Consistent with the other literature, though , the causality of this cycling is
impossible to detem1ine . There is no doubt that throughout the process Nixon and
Kissinger were responding to domestic electoral pressures, but the actions of both North
Vietnam and the Thieu regime in South Vietnam also exhibit a great deal of sensitivity
and awareness of the 4-year electoral cycle in American politics. That the North would
launch the two most massive offenses of the entire war early in the election years of 1968
st

and 1972, and vehemently insist that the agreements be signed on October 31 indicates
all too well that they knew that was the best time they had to achieve a negotiated
settlement.µ Thieu was also very aware of this and, consequently, rejected both peace
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proposals handed to him by the U.S. right before the election in the hopes of locking
them into another four years of support. That strategy worked in 1968, but in 1972 with
strong public opinion supporting an unconditional withdrawal of U.S. forces, and a
Congress that was increasingly willing to cut off funding for the war, it was clear that the
U.S. had had enough of the war in Vietnam and that Nixon could no longer afford to
maintain any U.S. presence there. Finally, the pressure that the Soviet Union put on
Hanoi in 1968 in the hopes of improving Humphrey's chances against Nixon is further
evidence that causation can work both ways where electoral cycles are concerned .
I began this study with the research question "why did it take over 4 years to end
American involvement in the Vietnam War when the public was opposed to it in 1968?"
because it was a rather puzzling to me that the U.S. stayed in the war that long . If the
majority of the public felt that U.S. involvement was a mistake by late 1967, then why
didn ' t the war end in 1968 or 1969? In February , 1973 the American Enterprise Institute
for Public Policy ho sted a televised debate involving two academics, two policymakers ,
and two journalists that addressed this very question. That debate was transcribed into a
book titled "Vietnam Settlement: Why 1973, Not 1969?" and, at the risk of grossly
oversimplifying the arguments presented there, the core of everyone ' s arguments seemed
to revolve around a few main points:
Those who argued that a settlement was only possible in 1973 did so with the
assumption that the U .S. was obligated to fulfill its commitment in the region, and that,
because of Vietnamization , the Thieu regime now had a reasonable chance to preserve its
independence from North Vietnamese aggression. Not one of the proponents said that

in over 6 years by the November election . Regardless of which way the issue is examined, though , the
election cycle is still the central motivational mechanism .
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this possibility of preservation was guaranteed, but that it would have been absolutely
impossible in 1968 and 1969 when the U.S. was still bearing almost all of the military
responsibility. Proponents of the 1969 side of the argument-while

admitting that it is

impossible to know for certain if an agreement could have been reached-assert

that

negotiations were never seriously pursued in 1968, 1969, or 1970 and that they should
have been .99 They also argued that the repeatedly poor performance of the ARYN had
proven the failures of Vietnamization, and that there was a good possibility that the South
Vietnamese government would fall anyway making the costs incurred in the previous 4
years incredibly high compared to any benefits gained from sticking it out.
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These arguments constituted a powerful argument at the time, and with the benefit
of hindsight that 30 years have given us, we are able to put everything into perspective
more easily. It is indeed true that Saigon fell shortly after the U.S. withdrawal and,
furthermore , we now know that Kissinger and Nixon negotiated the agreement with the
knowledge that the U.S. would probably only get a "decent interval" for all its efforts. 101
Looking back on the results , it now appears even more illogical that the U.S . did not at
least try to put forth a good-faith effort to achieve a negotiated settlement along the lines
of the 1973 agreement back in 1969. However , if the situation is examined from a
perspective that focuses on the structural and institutional effects of the U.S. election
cycle, it certainly seems that the events and the timing of the withdrawal did indeed
follow their own sort of inner logic . Furthermore, the fact that U.S. involvement seemed

99

Another one of their central arguments was that the U.S. had no strategic interest in the region .
Morton A. Kaplan, et al., Vietnam Settlement : Why 1973, Not 1969 ? (Washington D.C.: American
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research , 1973).
10 1
4>In terms of the electoral cycle , it should be noted that the 2 years of the decent interval that was
eve ntually achieved would put that fall toward the middle of the next presidential election cycle .
100

34

to go on longer than it should have in retrospect seems to lend at the very least
circumstantial evidence to support Gaubatz pessimistic claim that election cycles could
possibly lead to more severe war in the long run.
Previous scholarship on cycling has generally omitted the influence of the U.S.
electoral cycle on foreign policy and war , particularly concerning the resolution of
conflicts once they have already begun. This omission is not surprising considering the
widely accepted fact that foreign policy generally has little or no effect on the outcome of
Presidential elections. However, on the rare occasions where international crises such as
war force foreign policy concerns to the forefront, it would be wise to examine the
broader effects of cycles , particularly when it comes to the effects of the election cycle on
con fl ict-resol uti on .
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